On the basis of arguments showing that none of the most influential analyses of Moore’s paradox yields a successful resolution of the problem, a new analysis of it is offered. It is argued that, in attempting to render verdicts of either inconsistency or self-contradiction or self-refutation, those analyses have all failed to satisfactorily explain why a Moore-paradoxical proposition is such that it cannot be rationally believed. According to the proposed solution put forward here, a Moore-paradoxical proposition is one for which (...) the believer can have no non-overridden evidence. The arguments for this claim make use of some of Peter Klein’s views on epistemic defeasibility. It is further suggested that this proposal may have important meta-epistemological implications. (shrink)

For some of us, the defeasibility theory of knowledge remains the most plausible approach to the Gettier Problem. Epistemological fashion and faded memories notwithstanding, persuasive objections to the theory are very hard to find. The most impressive of those objections to the theory that have hitherto gone unanswered are examined and rejected here. These are objections put forward by Richard Feldman, Richard Foley, and John Turri. While these are all interesting, the objection recently put forward by Turri is, we think, (...) by far, the most serious threat to the theory that we have seen in a long time. A successful reply to it requires a surprising amount of care, as it turns out. If tenable, Turri's objection deals a devastating blow to the theory developed by Roderick Chisholm, Keith Lehrer, Peter Klein, Marshall Swain, Risto Hilpinen, John Pollock, and Paul Moser, among others. Under scrutiny, however, the threat proves illusory. It results from inattention to a crucial, but relatively subtle, aspect of.. (shrink)

The 'Gettier Problem' has been central to epistemology since 1963, when Edmund Gettier presented a powerful challenge to the standard analysis of knowledge. Now twenty-six leading philosophers examine the issues that arise from Gettier's challenge, setting the agenda for future work on the central problem of epistemology.

Those of us who have followed Fred Dretske’s lead with regard to epistemic closure and its impact on skepticism have been half-wrong for the last four decades. But those who have opposed our Dretskean stance, contextualists in particular, have been just wrong. We have been half-right. Dretske rightly claimed that epistemic status is not closed under logical implication. Unlike the Dretskean cases, the new counterexamples to closure offered here render every form of contextualist pro-closure maneuvering useless. But there is a (...) way of going wrong under Dretske’s lead. As the paper argues, Cartesian skepticism thrives on closure failure in a way that is yet to be acknowledged in the literature. The skeptic can make do with principles which are weaker than the familiar closure principles. But I will further claim that this is only a momentary reprieve for the skeptic. As it turns out, one of the weaker principles on which a skeptical modus tollens must rest can be shown false. (shrink)

Half a century later, a Dretskean stance on epistemic closure remains a minority view. Why? Mainly because critics have successfully poked holes in the epistemologies on which closure fails. However, none of the familiar pro-closure moves works against the counterexamples on display here. It is argued that these counterexamples pose the following dilemma: either accept that epistemic closure principles are false, and steal the thunder from those who attack classical logic on the basis of similarly problematic cases—specifically, relevance logicians and (...) like-minded philosophers—or stick with closure and surrender to relevantist claims of failure in truth-preservation aimed at classical rules of inference. Classicist closure advocates find the promise of a way out of the dilemma in the works of Roy Sorensen and John Hawthorne. The paper argues against their pro-closure move and renews Robert Audi’s call for a theory of closure-failure. (shrink)

It is argued, on the basis of new counterexamples, that neither knowledge nor epistemic justification (or “epistemic rationality”) can reasonably be thought to be closed under logical implication. The argument includes an attempt to reconcile the fundamental intuitions of the opposing parties in the debate.

Moore′s paradox came of age when John N. Williams gave us a simple paradoxical argument according to which the Moorean believer must hold false belief while believing contingent propositions. Simplicity was key; it was groundbreaking for the topic. On Williams′s account, given only the notions of inconsistency and self‐refutation, the thesis that belief distributes over conjunction, and a tiny bit of classical logic, we can derive a paradox from the Moorean propositional schemata. But, as argued here, it′s easy to overestimate (...) the significance of his argument to a proper understanding of the problem. His fundamental claim can be established in a way that shows how the paradox arises for any propositional attitude that distributes over conjunction, which gives us the opportunity to reconsider the problem we have been calling “Moore′s paradox”, and to conclude that all of the available analyses of the problem are, at best, incomplete. On this new approach, we lose a little formal simplicity vis‐à‐vis Williams′s approach, but make conceptual economy, as we gain a farther‐reaching problem than the one we have known. (shrink)

A concretização do direito à saúde deve ser viabilizada pelo Estado, com foco na efetivação das políticas públicas para garantia da implantação e funcionamento dos serviços demandados pelos respectivos grupos populacionais. Destarte, essa escrita objetivou analisar como o direito à saúde é contemplado em comunidades quilombolas de uma região geográfica baiana. Metodologicamente enquadra-se como de abordagem qualitativa, com informações obtidas por meio de entrevistas estruturadas (sobre a infraestrutura e/ou serviços públicos de saúde) desenvolvidas com as representações das Associações de Moradores (...) de 14 quilombos da região geográfica de Guanambi/Bahia durante o ano de 2016. Os achados indicam que uma comunidade possuía estrutura física específica para atendimentos básicos em saúde, no entanto, estava desativada. Três comunidades não tinham cobertura do Programa de Agentes Comunitários de Saúde (PACS). Entre as 11 que indicaram cobertura do Programa, em sete as(os) profissionais não residiam no território do quilombo. Diante da ampla ausência de infraestrutura e recorrente inadequação na prestação de serviços do PACS, evidencia-se a permanente negligência ao direito à saúde nesta população quilombola. (shrink)

Este artigo tem como objetivo analisar o modo como a linguagem religiosa é tratada por Wittgenstein, recorrendo, para isso, a alguns dos seus escritos que tangenciam esse tema. Inicialmente, será feita a exposição de alguns aspectos importantes de sua filosofia, em especial aqueles que abordam as relações entre linguagem e realidade, seja nos seus escritos iniciais, como no _Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus_, seja em sua filosofia tardia, que tem as _Investigações Filosóficas_ como sua obra mais emblemática. Após a exposição e a análise (...) do modo como a linguagem religiosa é tratada nos diferentes momentos de sua filosofia, será feita uma avaliação crítica de suas propostas. (shrink)

In this article, we will firstly explore the concept of connected design; secondly, we will explain how environments can be understood as interfaces for knowledge; and thirdly, we will expose the characteristics and objectives of the project Wired Book & Electronic Margin, which is part of a larger project called Universal Margin, as an example of connective design. Lastly, we will show the benefits of contextualizing information and transforming the world into a connected and lively real-time library, to underline how (...) connected design can facilitate a bottom-up construction of knowledge. (shrink)

Este artigo pretende discutir a universalidadedo problema hermenêutico na perspectivade H. G. Gadamer. O ponto de partida é areviravolta ontológica da hermenêutica realizadapor Heidegger. Por isso, tomando a ontologiafundamental como referência inicial, Gadamerapresenta a historicidade como princípio hermenêuticobásico e descobre na linguagem olugar filosófico por excelência, pois ela é, aomesmo tempo, acontecimento, especulação eabertura. Gadamer considera que no centroespeculativo da linguagem acontece a maisradical experiência humana: a experiência dafinitude.

A partir do diálogo Filebo, tentaremos mostrar, através da hermenêutica filosófica de Gadamer, como Platão funda sua Ética pondo em movimento a suprema ideia do Bem: princípio incondicionado, originário, mas não fixável; lugar onde se conciliam o ilimitado e o limite, o infinito e o finito, o não-ser e o ser, o sensível e o inteligível.

G. E. Moore identified a peculiar form of epistemic irrationality. Wittgenstein called it “Moore’s Paradox”. Neither of them knew exactly what he was talking about. And yet, the vast literature on the problem leaves no room for doubt: the paradox is deep; its resolution, elusive. But, up until now, we haven’t been in a position to appreciate its importance for contemporary epistemology. This paper puts forward an epistemological solution to the paradox. It also seeks to show that the paradox yields (...) counter-examples to deductive closure claims for both epistemic rationality and knowledge that are immune to contextualist pro-closure maneuvers. (shrink)

The aim of the thesis is twofold. Firstly, it is argued that Frege's theory of meaning and denotation is the first successful non-psychologistic response to what has been called 'the puzzle of identity' and that, where Frege's theory differs most significantly from the theory of meaning and denotation developed by Russell in The Principles of Mathematics and in his unpublished manuscripts on logic of 1903-1905, Russell was right. Secondly, it is shown that Russell was again right when he claimed that (...) the central argument of 'On Denoting' completely discredits both his own and Frege's theory of meaning and denotation. An interpretation of the relevant passage of 'On Denoting' is put forward. The discussion makes evident that it is virtually impossible to disentangle that argument if one ignores his unpublished work on the topic. (shrink)

Digital persona is a part of the individual identity that has been extended into the online sphere to which corresponds a digital unconscious structuring a digitally divided self. It has personal, social, institutional, legal, scientific and technological aspects that have to be reconsidered to allow for new ways of understanding and managing identity. However, the fragmentation of scientific analysis fails to explain what happens to the digital personae in an interdisciplinary way. This is reflected by the current lack of comprehensive (...) framework, the tendency to develop fragmentary management tools and gaps in legal frameworks. In this context society, experts, institutions and groups are still in a fragile unconscious, or pre-conscious phase, regarding the opportunities and problems associated with the management of digital persona. The objective of this article is to offer a first set of comprehensive features that shape the personal and social sense of digital selfhood and identity and provoke a reflection regarding the future personal, social and institutional management of our digital personae. This on-going research aims at contributing to define the digital persona and to develop models and typologies of digital personhood that are still being developed. (shrink)